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In a typical LNG installation, a rapid depressurization can cause cryogenic temperatures in both upstream and downstream connected process equipment and piping. This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as auto-refrigeration, can compromise the equipment’s mechanical integrity and pose a risk of material embrittlement. As vessel metal walls are exposed to temperatures below the minimum design metal temperature (MDMT), permanent damage is possible.

The present paper focuses on the results from several PSM audits performed between 2010 and 2016, at several different Chemical Process Industry (CPI) facilities. On the one hand, we have evaluated how well these facilities complied with the requirements of the OSHA PSM Standard. On the other hand, the data from the audit findings has been compiled and statistically processed in order to compare the main common findings with the results of those analyzed by OSHA’s Refinery and Chemical National Emphasis Programs (NEP) in 2012.

The main purpose of a a Fire and Gas (FGS) mapping study is to identify and assess the placement and performance of gas flammable, toxic, and fire detectors.

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) vapor dispersion analysis is heavily influenced by the estimation of the source term: (a) the LNG (liquid) leak rate and duration, and (b) the pool spreading and vaporization. A sophisticated dispersion model will produce the wrong answer if the source term used is in error.

Large equipment items, such as distillation column systems, compressors, or major pressure vessels, are commonly protected by multiple pressure relief devices mounted on a common inlet manifold. In selecting this type of design, the potential exists to inadvertently overlook the flow characteristics associated with such a common inlet manifold.

This paper examines an overpressure relief protection for pipeline, specifically designed for hydrogen peroxide transport over an extended distance. Presented as a case study, it includes a series of sensitivity analyses, accounting for all credible overpressure scenarios, to obtain an optimal placement of relief devices along the pipeline.

When not properly evaluated and controlled, changes to physical equipment in a facility can lead to serious incidents with potentially severe consequences. Management of Change (MOC) systems, replete with a variety of electronic systems, flow charts, and checklists, have been developed by a number of reliable organizations throughout the world to manage these physical changes.

The purpose of this article is to present a basic understanding of flames, flame arresters, and the multitudinous designs of flame arresters to help an Emergency Relief System (ERS) designer in selecting an appropriate flame arrester. The need to understand the characteristics of the flammable system and appropriate testing is presented. Various prominent manufacturers of flame arresters are presented and a recommendation to select the final product is also presented.

Since its inception in 2001, ioMosaic Corporation has conducted several hundred Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) studies. In the conduct of these studies, accurate and retrievable recording of this safety exercise is vital.

In a 2001 comprehensive investigation report on reactive chemicals, the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) reported that 22% of reactive chemicals incidents occurred in storage equipment and 25% occurred in reactors. 167 incidents were considered between 1980 and 2001. Although not specific to polymer systems, the storage equipment category includes monomer storage tanks and the reactors category includes polymerization reactors. Free-radical polymerization reactions are the best studied reactions in all of chemistry.

Inhibitors are chemical substances that are used in small amounts to suppress the polymerization reaction of a monomer. An inhibitor has to be completely consumed before a polymerization reaction can proceed at normal rates. The time required to completely consume the inhibitor is often referred to as an ”induction” time.

The API and ASME guidelines and standards for emergency relief systems both state that total nonrecoverable inlet pressure losses between protected equipment and a spring-loaded relief valve should be limited to 3% of the relief valve set pressure.

Accurate estimates of fluid flow reaction forces are especially necessary for pressure relief systems. Substantial fluid flow reaction forces can be developed when relief systems actuate for both reactive and non-reactive systems. Specific relief systems scenarios where dynamic loads may be important include but are not limited to pressure relief caused by runaway reactions, loss of high-pressure/low-pressure interface, control valve failure, heat exchanger tube failure, etc.

Determining if and when a vessel and/or piping component is going to fail under fire exposure and/or from cold temperature embrittlement is an important factor in consequence analysis and risk assessment. This paper describes detailed methods for establishing the conditions for vessel/piping failure and whether the material of construction for vessels and piping is properly selected for fire exposure and/or cold depressuring/relief.